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THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM IN ENERGY
REGULATION
TINA CALILUNG*
The regulation of electricity markets in the United States can be viewed
as an optimization problem involving several objective functions:
balancing electricity supply and demand; minimizing consumer prices;
and minimizing environmental costs. The ideal regulatory scheme
would produce the perfect mix of generation resources, to provide
reliable capacity that meets consumer demand at the lowest price with
the least environmental impact. Federalism, however, requires the
separation of regulatory authority over electricity production between
federal and state bodies. Moreover, in restructured energy markets,
deregulation further distributes decision-making authority to market
actors who, through their collective actions, determine market prices
and supply. Such fragmented jurisdictional authority can lead
regulatory bodies, acting in furtherance of their individual objectives,
to work towards conflicting goals. In some instances, federal
preemption requires legitimate state goals to yield to federal objectives.
The Clean Power Plan ("CPP'), the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's ("EPA") proposed regulation of carbon emissions released by
existing coal-fired power plants, establishes a framework of cooperative
federalism that grants states vast flexibility for achieving federally-
mandated emissions reduction goals. The tools available to states for
designing implementation plans can also advance state energy goals,
like promoting fuel diversity and enhancing system reliability, which
may otherwise be preempted by federal law.
* The author would like to thank her family, especially her mother Evelyn, who has
graciously contributed to this work with their endless support. The author would also
like to thank Professor William J. Snape III for his invaluable advice and
encouragement, and Eddy Rivero for guiding her through the writing process.
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INTRODUCTION
Electricity is the indispensable form of energy that enables technological
innovation and productivity growth in the modem world.' The unique
characteristics of electricity, however, create challenges for the regulation
of electricity generation and transmission.2 Electricity cannot be efficiently
stored in bulk and as a result, the supply and demand for electricity must be
instantaneously and continuously balanced over the interconnected
transmission grid.3 Interconnected grids ensure that any electricity that
enters the system moves in interstate commerce.4 As such, the Commerce
1. See generally Stephanie Karekezi et al., Energy, Poverty and Development, in
GLOBAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 151, 157 (2012),
available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-
Energy-Assessment/Global Energy.Assessment FullReport.pdf (explaining that
access to electricity supply is a prerequisite to reducing poverty).
2. Steven Ferrey, Alternative Energy in a Spaghetti Western: Clint Eastwood
Confronts State Renewable Energy Policy, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REv. 279, 279 (2012)
(asserting that the characteristics of electric energy have legal facets that states have not
always fully appreciated).
3. Id. (explaining that generator imbalance can cause disruptions to the national
electricity system, including shut downs and equipment damage).
4. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2014); see also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 756, 757 (1982) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more
basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy . . . No [s]tate relies on its
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Clause necessitates separate federal and state regulation of electricity
sales.5 However, the site selection and construction of new power plants,
excluding nuclear and hydropower plants, is deemed a local concern
subject to state regulation.6 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")
licenses and regulates commercial nuclear power planis, and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") provides similar oversight for
hydropower facilities.
Electric power generation is also a source of significant environmental
costs. Fossil fuel generation provided 67% of global electricity-generating
capacity in 2008.8 It also accounted for most local conventional pollution,
including sulfur oxides, nitrous oxides, particulate matter, and global
carbon dioxide pollution.9 To this end, the EPA regulates conventional fuel
power plant operations, including pollution control, the handling of coal
combustion byproducts, and cooling water intake structures.t0
Fragmented authority over electricity generation and sales can lead
regulators to work at cross-purposes." To the extent that regulatory
own resources in this respect").
5. See Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83,
89-90 (1927) (holding that the interstate sale of electricity is not subject to regulation
by either of the two states for the protection of their local interests); see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(a) (2012) (establishing exclusive federal regulation of transmission and
wholesale electricity sales); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012) (reserving for the states the
authority to regulate retail electricity sales).
'6. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012) (reserving for the states the authority to regulate
"facilities used for the generation of electric energy").
7. See James W. Moeller, State Regulation of Nuclear Power and National
Energy Policy, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 4-5 (1992) (explaining
that the Atomic Energy Act establishes a "virtually unique" comprehensive scheme for
the regulation of commercial nuclear power plants by the NRC); see also Peter Huber,
Electricity and the Environment: In Search ofRegulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. REv.
1002, 1011 (1987) (referring to First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, which upheld
the authority of the federal agency to preempt state regulation of the licensing of new
hydroelectric development).
8. Eric D. Larson et al., Fossil Energy, in GLOBAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT:
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 901, 910 (2012), available at
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-
Assessment/GlobalEnergyAssessmentFullReport.pdf.
9. See id. at 910-911 (observing that reduction of conventional pollution is more
urgent in developing countries due to the immediate damage to public health and the
environment).
10. See Michael Gergen et al., Walking the Line Between the Clean Air Act and the
Federal Power Act: Balancing Emission Reductions and Bulk Power Reliability, 35
ELECTRICITY J. Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 16, 18. (explaining that EPA regulations are
promulgated under Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Recovery and
Conservation Act).
11. Cf Huber, supra note 7 at, 1044, 1054 (arguing that the irretrievably
fragmented regulation of the safety and environmental impacts of electric power plants
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decision-making is disjointed and dispersed among numerous entities with
competing goals, one regulatory objective, whether it is market
competition, system reliability, or environmental stewardship, may have to
yield to another.
This Comment argues that the EPA's cooperative federalism approach to
the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by coal-fired power plants may
afford states with deregulated electricity markets the opportunity to achieve
objectives for the provision of electricity supply that would otherwise be
barred by federal preemption of state laws. Part II provides an overview of
the regulation of wholesale electricity sales and the development of
deregulated electricity markets. Part III examines a series of cases
involving the PJM electricity market to illustrate how the FERC's
wholesale ratemaking authority preempts the authority of states
participating in deregulated electricity markets to subsidize the construction
of new power plants in order to resolve reliability concerns. Finally, Part
IV suggests that states participating in deregulated electricity markets can
use the regulatory framework of the CPP to mandate the construction of
new power plants, despite the preemption findings in the PJM cases.
This Comment assumes the validity of the CPP. The proposed
regulation, however, is the subject of legal challenges that pertain to issues
that lie outside the purview of this Comment.12 Notwithstanding current
and prospective legal challenges, the CPP's design may afford deregulated
states the ability to direct some of their generation resource planning,
which would otherwise be determined solely by market mechanisms.
I. ENERGY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO
DEREGULATION
Regulation of the production and sale of electricity is an expansive task
that has resulted in a system of rules as complex and multi-faceted as the
energy commodity itself. 3 At the turn of the twentieth century, electric
utility companies were largely organized as vertically integrated
monopolies that owned and operated electric power plants, transmitted
electricity to captive local service areas, and distributed electricity to retail
leads to environmentally regressive technological choices).
12. See, e.g., Neela Banjaree, 12 States Sue Over the EPA Proposed Power Plant
Regulations, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-epa-
laWsuit-20140805-story.html (reporting that plaintiffs allege that the EPA regulation is
illegal because power plant emissions are regulated under a different part of the Clean
Air Act).
13. See generally Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean
Energy Floors, 91 N.C.L. REV. 1283, 1316 (2013) (observing that the regulation of
electricity addresses multiple services consisting of the wholesale supply of electricity,
transmission, and retail distribution to end-use customers).
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customers. 14 Because each utility supplied its own capacity resources,15
electricity sales consisted entirely of retail sales, which were subject to
state and local regulation.' 6 The lack of interconnection meant that there
was little competition among utilities. However, as the development of
high-voltage transmission lines capable of carrying electricity over long
distances enabled interstate wholesale electricity sales, a federal regulatory
framework emerged." This framework would adapt over time to address
multiple policy objectives, namely the provision of least-cost electricity
through competition, the promotion of system reliability, and the
minimization of adverse environmental impacts.' 9
A. The Rise ofFederal Electricity Regulation
Growing interstate competition among electric utilities in the early
twentieth century necessitated federal oversight of wholesale electricity
sales. 20 The ability of electric utilities to generate power in one state and
transmit it to another state for distribution raises Commerce Clause issues
and effectively elevates the regulation of electricity sales from a state
concern to a national interest.21  In the seminal case, Public Utilities
Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., a Rhode
Island electric utility agreed to supply Attleboro Steam & Electric
Company, a Massachusetts utility, all of the electricity required to serve
Attleboro's retail electricity load.22 When the Public Utilities Commission
of Rhode Island unilaterally increased the wholesale electricity price,
14. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (D.N.J. 2013).
15. Id. at 381 (defining capacity as the ability to produce sufficient energy to meet
demand).
16. Id. at 383 (explaining that each utility was granted an exclusive service
territory by the state).
17. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (stating that although there were
some interconnections between utilities, most operated as separate individual
monopolies).
18. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84 (explaining that utilities no longer had to
maintain capacity to meet peak demand because they could contract bilaterally in
wholesale markets to supply peak demand).
19. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 7-10 (explaining that improved efficiency
in power generation and the development of interconnected transmission grids leads to
Congressional action to promote the development of new generation facilities, the
conservation of fossil fuels, and the development of competitive bulk power markets).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (illustrating the Attleboro gap, which was
ultimately filled by the Federal Power Act).
21. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-
90 (1927) (holding that the transmission of electricity between two states is interstate
commerce, and as such the rates charged for wholesale electricity is not subject to
regulation by either state).
22. Id. at 85-86 (specifying a basic rate for electricity sold).
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Attleboro objected on the ground that the Commission's regulation placed
a direct burden on interstate commerce.23
The Supreme Court held that the price of electricity sold by the Rhode
Island company to the Massachusetts company was not subject to
regulation by either state "in the guise of the protection of their local
,,24interests. Instead, the regulation of wholesale electricity sales could be
achieved only "by the exercise of the power vested in Congress." 2 5
Congress enacted Part II of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") in 1935 to fill
the regulatory gap identified in Attleboro.2 6
B. The FPA and Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA"):
Zeitgeists of the New Deal and the Arab Oil Embargo
Part II of the FPA is broadly viewed as a New Deal consumer protection
measure that curbs monopoly abuses by utility companies and promotes the
provision of electricity at the lowest possible rates. 2 7 The statute bifurcates
the regulation of electricity sales between the federal government and the
states.28 Section 201 of the FPA established exclusive federal jurisdiction,
exercised by the FERC, over the transmission and sale of electric energy in
interstate commerce. 2 9 Section 205 requires the FERC to ensure just and
reasonable rates for the transmission or sale of wholesale electricity, and, at
the same time, prohibits undue discrimination and preferential treatment.30
States, on the other hand, retain their traditional authority over retail
23. Id. at 86 (finding that the rate was unreasonably low and could threaten the
general public welfare if it prevented the Rhode Island utility from fully serving its
other customers).
24. Id. at 90 (creating the "Attleboro gap").
25. Id. (noting the national interest encompassed within interstate electricity sales).
26. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (noting that the FPA went beyond
the Attleboro gap and extended federal control to some areas that had previously been
governed by the states).
27. See Pub. Sys. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 973, 979 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (observing
that the just and reasonable standard of the FPA aims to protect consumers from
exorbitant prices and unfair business practices); Contra Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13,
at 1320 (arguing that Congress' original design in the FPA was not limited to
preserving low electricity rates, but also "established a framework for articulation of
national energy goals and their implementation by the states").
28. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13, at 1343 (noting that the FPA provided a
structure designed to disable states from the extremes of protectionist wholesale price
regulation that imposed costs on other states, without displacing the ability of states to
pursue their own retail pricing policies).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (expressly limiting federal regulation only to those
matters which are not subject to regtilation by the states).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b) (2012) (clarifying that FERC jurisdiction does not
extend to local distribution and transmission of electricity in intrastate commerce).
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electricity rates and power generation facilities.
While the FPA may have been founded on the principle of consumer
price protection, evolving market conditions have forced Congress to
explicitly incorporate other goals into the national electricity regulatory
policy. 32  For example, in the 1970s, approximately one-third of the
nation's electricity was generated using oil and gas.33 When the 1973 Arab
Oil Embargo almost quadrupled oil prices within a six-month period, the
rapid increase in the price of fuel inputs resulted in higher power plant
operating costs, decreased efficiency of the generating units, and ultimately
higher consumer electricity prices. Congress passed PURPA in 1978 to
combat the impacts of the energy crisis on the electricity sector through
conservation and energy efficiency.
PURPA explicitly embraced multiple policy goals, namely, (1)
conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities; (2) optimization of the
efficiency of facilities and resources by electric utilities; and (3) provision
of equitable rates to electricity consumers.37 The development of
renewable energy resources, such as solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal
energy, was an attendant PURPA goal, as non-traditional energy sources
signified safe, environmentally attractive substitutes for scarce fossil
fuels.38 Accordingly, Section 210 of PURPA required electric utilities to
purchase wholesale electricity from qualifying cogeneration 39 and small
31. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383-84 (D.N.J. 2013)
(observing that from 1920 to the late 1980s, utilities operated under the concurrent
supervision of federal and state regulators).
32. E.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 743 (1982) (enumerating the three
regulatory goals of PURPA).
33. Id. at 745 (noting that electricity generation was one of the fastest growing
sectors of the nation's economy).
34. Michael L. Ross, How the 1973 Oil Embargo Saved the Planet, FOREIGN AFF.
(Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140173/michael-l-
ross/how-the-1973-oil-embargo-saved-the-planet.
35. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 745-46 (determining that Congress was
concerned with conserving oil and natural gas).
36. See Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419, 421 (1995) (explaining that PURPA was Part
V of the National Energy Act, which was intended to further the United States' energy
self-sufficiency).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012) (achieving these goals entailed adopting and
implementing specific rate designs).
38. Cudahy, supra note 36, at 421 (explaining that non-traditional resources were
non-depletable and environmentally benign).
39. See generally W.M. WARWICK, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY FEDERAL ENERGY
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, AND
RESTRUCTURING U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS, A.5 (2002), available at
http://eere.pnnl.gov/femp/publications/Primer-
ElectricUtilitiesDeregulationRestructuring.pdf (defining a cogenerator as an efficient,
2015 329
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA WREVIEW
power production facilities at full-avoided cost.4 0  As the energy crisis
subsided, however, competition and energy market liberalization overtook
conservation and fuel diversity as prime regulatory goals.
C. The Rising Tide ofDeregulation and Market-Based Reforms
Academic criticism of regulatory capture is considered the fountainhead
of the deregulation movement. 4 1 The notion that regulatory agencies tend
to be captured by the industries that they are tasked to regulate cast doubt
on the need for direct regulation, and has galvanized industry-wide
restructuring of telecommunications, railroads, airlines, and natural gas.42
In 1992, the FERC issued Order No. 636, which increased competition
in the natural gas market by requiring gas pipeline companies to unbundle
their supply and transportation services, and to provide "open access
transportation that is equal in quality for all gas supplies, regardless of
whether the gas is supplied by the pipeline company or not." 43 This non-
discriminatory access to pipeline transportation services revolutionized the
natural gas industry by spurring unprecedented exploration and pipeline
construction, which increased natural gas supply, reduced prices, and
effectively erased memories of the fuel shortages of the 1970s.4 These
market forces had a profound impact on the electricity industry, as cheap
natural gas became the preferred fossil fuel for electricity generation.45
Moreover, the deregulation of the natural gas market became the model for
restructuring the electricity market.46
Rising electricity costs, despite little to no growth in electricity usage,
had led to the general sense that electricity prices could only be reduced
environmentally preferable facility that produces electricity and another useful form of
thermal energy).
40. Cudahy, supra note 36, at 422 (explaining that electric utilities were reluctant
to purchase power from competing independent power producers).
41. Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 161 (2001) (citing works by Coase, Demsetz, and Stigler &
Friedland).
42. Id. at 161-69 (citing the Interstate Commerce Commission as a bellwether of
declining independent regulatory agencies).
43. Re Pipeline Serv. Obligations, 59 FERC ¶ 61,030, 1992 WL 510723, at *4
(Apr. 8, 1992) (allowing gas pipeline customers to select gas supply and transportation
services).
44. Warick, supra note 39, at 6.3 (noting that as gas prices fell, profits increased
from increased sales).
45. Cudahy, supra note 36, at 424 (explaining that natural gas is utilized by
combustion turbine plants, which can be constructed quickly and with less capital).
46. Warick, supra note 39, at 6.4; accord Cudahy, supra note 41, at 169 ("In a
number of respects, natural gas was to be the model for electricity deregulation, but in
practice electricity has proven more challenging.").
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through competition. In response, Congress and the FERC followed the
natural gas deregulation model and undertook a series of market-based
reforms to promote competition in the wholesale electricity market. 4 8 First,
the Energy Policy Act of 1992 authorized the FERC to order individual
utilities to provide transmission services to unaffiliated wholesale power
generators on a case-by-case basis. 4 9 In 1995, the FERC issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking that outlined a rule requiring public utilities that own
transmission facilities to provide non-discriminatory open-access
transmission services, essentially making transmission companies common
carriers of electricity.50  The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ultimately
resulted in FERC Order No. 888, which ordered the "functional
unbundling" of wholesale generation and transmission services." To
promote the efficiency of electricity transmission systems, the FERC
encouraged market participants to organize into Regional Transmission
Organizations ("RTOs"), which exercise consolidated control of all
transmission services and provide a platform for wholesale power
markets.5 2
The market-based transformation of wholesale electricity markets also
aligned with PURPA reform, as reformers decried the law's mandatory
purchase obligation as outdated and anticompetitive.53 The Energy Policy
47. See Cudahy, supra note 41, at 171 (explaining that cost overruns in the
construction of nuclear power plants implied that economies of scale could not be
realized to reduce electricity prices).
48. See generally id. at 159 (clarifying that electricity transmission and distribution
remain regulated functions as they constitute natural monopolies). See also id. at 170
(noting that large industrial users seeking to shop for cheaper power pushed for retail
competition).
49. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721, 16 U.S.C. § 8240) (2012).
50. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,663-64 (Mar. 28,
1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86) ("To achieve the benefits of robust, competitive
bulk power markets, all wholesale buyers and sellers must have equal access to the
transmission grid.").
51. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 11 (2002) (explaining that functional
unbundling requires "each utility to state separate rates for wholesale generation,
transmission, and ancillary services, and to take transmission of its own wholesale sales
and purchases under a single general tariff').
52. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799-800 (D. Md.,
2013) (explaining that vertically integrated utilities denying transmission access to
alternative producers inhibited the development of wholesale electricity markets).
53. Michael D. Hornstein & J.S. Gebhart Stroemer, The Energy Policy Act of
2005: PURPA Reform, the Amendments and Their Implications, 27 ENERGY L.J. 25, 31
(2006) (proffering other critiques such as unnecessary costs and insufficient
encouragement of renewable resource development). Contra Cudahy, supra note 36, at
425 (arguing that PURPA introduced competition into the electric marketplace through
regulatory intervention).
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Act of 2005 provided for the termination of an electric utility's obligation
to purchase wholesale power from qualifying facilities if the FERC finds
that cogeneration and small power production facilities have
nondiscriminatory access to sell energy and capacity in wholesale
electricity markets.54 Critics of PURPA reform, however, were concerned
that a competition regime would result in market mechanisms that would
converge on a "cheapest power approach," which recognizes only
intemalized costs and ignores intangible societal values such as fuel
diversity, reliability, and environmental costs.15  Electriccity market
restructuring at both the wholesale and retail levels unearthed tensions
between consumer populism, which entails providing electricity at the
lowest possible cost, and advancement of other societal and regulatory
values.5 6
By way of example, deregulation of retail electricity markets enjoyed
wide support in states with high retail electricity rates, which stymied
economic growth as businesses chose to expand in low-cost states.5 7
Proponents of deregulation promised lower retail rates through both
consumer choice and competition in electricity supply.58  , California's
deregulation measures required investor-owned utilities to divest their
electricity-generating assets. 59 The deregulated power supply would be bid
to the California Independent System Operator on a daily basis, and load-
serving utilities would purchase their supply requirements in a competitive
wholesale market.60  Utilities were prohibited by law from purchasing
54. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m).
55. See Cudahy, supra note 36, at 421 (commenting that the FERC, in
disapproving a PURPA order as unnecessary and expensive, "does not seem to permit
assessing the probabilities of even an impending or foreseeable conversion of social
costs to pecuniary costs").
56. See id. at 436 (predicting that the FERC's PURPA enforcement could lead to
an approach wherein internalized costs are dispositive and work to the exclusion of
other regulatory values, including environment, diversity of generation, energy self-
sufficiency).
57. Warwick, supra note 39, at 6.1.2 (explaining that state integrated resource
planning maintained low rates, but the process was adversarial, time-consuming, and
expensive).
58. See Cudahy, supra note 41, at 170 (explaining that large industrial retail
customers promoted retail deregulation as means of securing cheaper power).
59. Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a
Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297, 299 (2002) (clarifying that as retail price
caps discouraged retail customers from switching electricity suppliers, utilities still had
to supply over 90 percent of the power being sold in the state despite having divested
their generation assets).
60. Id. (explaining that after deregulation the California Energy Commission no
longer assessed the State's generation needs).
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power through long-term contracts.6 1 On the demand side, consumers were
free to shop among retail service providers; however, retail prices were
initially reduced by ten percent and subsequently frozen at that level.62
The California plan famously imploded in 2000 when the market failed
to produce sufficient electricity supply to meet consumer needs.63 A
combination of factors, including increased demand due to a growing
economy and unusually hot summer temperatures, as well as a lack of
supply due to reduced output from hydropower facilities, a failure to add
new generating capacity in the past, and manipulation of the spot market,
resulted in soaring wholesale electricity rates and rolling blackouts. 4
Utility companies faced bankruptcy as the retail rate freeze prevented them
from recovering their purchased power costs. 65
The market failure in California challenges the notion that the least-cost
mix of generation produced by a competitive market, also provides the
most reliable sources of electricity. 66 Some observers questioned whether
market price signals alone are enough to ensure the level of system
reliability demanded by the public. 67  The tension between competitive
electricity markets and reliability concerns arose once again in recent
litigation over state-subsidized power projects.
D. The PJM Cases
In a series of cases involving the PJM Interconnection, LLC ("PJM")
market, (hereinafter collectively referred to as the PJM cases) t federal
courts were called upon to adjudicate the boundary between the FERC's
authority to set wholesale electricity rates and a state's authority to
incentivize the construction of generating facilities in deregulated
61. Cudahy, supra note 41, at 174 (explaining that utilities could not hedge their
forward electricity supply, leaving them exposed to wholesale price increases).
62. Id. at 175 (describing the retail price freeze as a concession to residential
customers to garner political support for deregulation).
63. See id. at 177 (recounting that when wholesale electricity prices increased
dramatically, electric utilities implemented rolling black-outs as a means of rationing
the available wholesale electricity, which was in shortage).
64. Id. at 174 (noting also that the Department of Energy under the Clinton
Administration issued orders for wholesale generators to continue serving the
California market; the Bush Administration discontinued the order in Jan. 2001).
65. Ferrey, supra note 59, at 309 (describing PG&E's Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing in April 2001).
66. See Cudahy, supra note 36, at 438 (observing that market proponents espoused
an "expansive faith in competition and toward the rejection of policy judgments
articulated independently of market forces").
67. Cudahy, supra note 41, at 186 ("It may be that the price signals are not quick
enough or sure enough means of controlling the electricity delivery system to satisfy
the public demand for reliability and price stability.").
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electricity markets.68
PJM operates the country's largest competitive wholesale electricity
market, in a region spanning from North Carolina to Chicago. 69 As the
system operator, PJM must secure a sufficient amount of electric capacity
within its footprint to provide reliable service during periods of peak
demand. 70 To this end, PJM holds competitive capacity auctions wherein
generators bid to supply capacity three years in advance; the auction clears
at the price where the offered supply equals the forecasted demand.7 '
PJM's FERC-approved market design, known as the Reliability Pricing
Model ("RPM"), is meant to provide long-term forward price signals to
indicate scarcity and the need for new capacity. 72 Electricity-generating
companies will decide whether to expand operations or construct new
power plants based on these market signals.73
While the FERC was satisfied that the RPM had succeeded in securing
sufficient capacity for the PJM region as whole, some state and local
authorities, including those in Maryland and New Jersey, argued that the
RPM failed to inspire new development necessary to meet reliability needs
in their local areas.74 In response to the perceived localized market failures,
Maryland and New Jersey individually offered out-of-market subsidies to
select project developers for the construction of new natural gas-fired
power plants in certain capacity-deficient areas.75 The FERC
68. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014); .PPL EnergyPlus,
LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013), aff'd by PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3564 (Dec.
10, 2014) (No. 14-694); ; PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D.
Md. 2013), affd 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W.
3450 (Nov. 25, 2014) (No. 14-614).
69. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006) (explaining that the
PJM market covers 14 states from the Eastern Seaboard, including North Carolina, to
Chicago).
70. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 82 (explaining that PJM requires member
utilities that sell electricity to end-use customers to secure their proportionate shares of
the expected peak load three years in advance).
71. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
72. Id. at 387-88; see also PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 FERC at ¶ 62,652-56
(approving the RPM to replace existing market rules, which the FERC found to be
unjust and unreasonable because the old rules created significant price volatility and
failed to set prices at levels necessary to ensure sufficient investment to meet the
anticipated growth in electricity demand).
73. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88 (clarifying that forward price signals do not
signify long-term revenue assurances for generators and developers).
74. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,145, 2011 WL 5893596 at *1-2
(Nov. 17, 2011) (recounting the states' argument that the Minimum Offer Price Rule
(MOPR) impedes state and local efforts to ensure reliability by mitigating or
automatically raising the offer price of certain new projects).
75. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974. F. Supp. 2d 790, 821 (D. Md.
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countermanded these state initiatives by changing the PJM tariff to
eliminate such state-sponsored entries.7 6 The FERC argued that subsidized,
uneconomic entry into competitive markets can produce unjust wholesale
rates by artificially depressing capacity prices.77 Conversely, Maryland and
New Jersey argued that the FERC's action encroached upon the states'
exclusive authority over "facilities used for the generation of electric
energy" under the FPA.
The courts ultimately resolved the jurisdictional conflict in the FERC's
favor based on the field preemption doctrine. In PPL Energyplus, LLC v.
Nazarian and PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, the federal district courts of
Maryland and New Jersey respectively determined that the states
impermissibly intruded upon the FERC's exclusive ratemaking authority
under Section 205 of the FPA when they mandated subsidized payments to
state-approved projects. 7 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit wrestled with the inverse proposition in New Jersey Board ofPublic
Utilities v. FERC, and found that the FERC, in limiting the states' ability to
subsidize capacity bids, did not interfere with the states' authority to
regulate generating facilities.80 Thus, the traditional power of the states to
direct the construction of electricity generation resources is inherently
circumscribed by the constructs of the competitive markets in which they
participate. However, the Third Circuit, in PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v.
2013) (explaining that the Maryland Public Service Commission ordered electric
distribution companies ("EDCs") to enter in contracts for differences, which guarantee
project developers fixed revenues); Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (explaining that the
N.J. LCAPP statute required EDCs to pay eligible generators the difference between
the capacity auction clearing price and their actual development costs).
76. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 135 FERC T 61,022, 61,106, 2011 WL 1383624 at
**28-29 (Apr. 12, 2011) (eliminating the state-mandated exemption to the Minimum
Offer Price Rule).
77. Id. at 61,105-06 (citing the Pennsylvania Commission's argument that one
state's subsidized uneconomic entry can depress overall market prices and discourage
investment in other states).
78. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 95 (3d Cir. 2014) (also
articulating the states' second argument that the FERC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it approved the elimination of the state-mandated exemption to the
MOPR without sufficiently explaining its reasons for departing from the 2006
Settlement).
79. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 825-29; Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 407-09.
80. NJ. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 97-98 (citing Conn. Dep't of Util. Control
v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that New Jersey and Maryland are
free to make their own decisions regarding how to satisfy their capacity needs, but they
"will appropriately bear the costs of [those] decisions")'.
81. See Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 829 ("[A]fter a generator physically comes
into existence and operation and participates in the wholesale electric energy market,
the prices or rates received by that generator in exchange for wholesale energy and
capacity sales are within the sole purview of the federal government.").
2015 335
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW
Solomon, affirmed the findings of the district court in Hanna and clarified
that states can use other policy tools that do not affect wholesale rates to
achieve their reliability goals.82 Thus, when states regulate within their
authority to select the types of new generation facilities to be built and
where to build them, the incidental effects of the new supply on wholesale
electricity rates do not trigger federal jurisdiction.83
II. BEYOND SUBOPTIMAL: MOVING AWAY FROM DECISION-MAKING IN A
SILO
The essential nature of electricity in the modem world demands that
regulation of this commodity embrace various societal goals.84 If
regulation is "the art of making unpleasant choices wisely,"85 then the
regulation of electricity is an optimization problem with several
simultaneous objective functions. To the extent that electricity is positively
correlated with economic wellbeing, regulation must aim to minimize
electricity costs in order to protect consumers from the abuses of monopoly
power by electric utility companies. Moreover, as reliable electric supply
is necessary to support public welfare, regulation must secure sufficient
generating and transmission capacity to meet electricity demand. Finally,
as the national grid and the myriad power plants that feed it impose
significant environmental costs, regulation must both minimize harm to
public health and the environment, and secure public consent for
82. PPLEnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2014).
83. Id. at 255 ("The states' regulatory choices accumulate in to the supply
transacted through the interstate market.").
84. See Huber, supra note 7, at 1003-04 (arguing that electricity is inseparably
married to national welfare through its impact on the national economy and the
environment).
85. Id. at 1004-05 (internal quotations omitted) (as risk is ubiquitous, "the
regulation of health, safety, and the environment presents its own brand of tragic
choice").
86. See id. at 1003 n.1 (noting that growth in electricity supply has accompanied
growth in the national economy for many decades, but causation is unclear); Rossi &
Hutton, supra note 13, at 1318 (explaining that the conventional account of the FPA's
just and reasonable standard as a New Deal deterrent against monopoly abuses is
consonant with the progressive era's regulatory focus on keeping rates as low as
possible to protect consumers); Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13, at 1306 (explaining that
the avoided cost requirement under PURPA reflects a consumer protection objective).
87. See also Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CoNN. L. REV.
217, 254 (2012) (observing that the growing gap between electricity supply and
demand, as evidenced by prior blackouts, raised Congressional concern over national
energy security); Cf 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2012) (providing that in times of war or
electricity shortage, the FERC has the authority to order the generation, delivery,
interchange, or transmission of electric energy that will best meet the emergency or
serve the public interest).
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development.
Some of the decisions that confront electricity regulators include: how
much generating and transmitting capacity should be installed; what type of
generating technology should be employed; how much utility companies
can charge for wholesale and retail sales; and whether the rates should be
determined through regulation or market-based processes.89 To complicate
matters further, constitutional limitations, federalism, and the discrete
jurisdictional boundaries of federal agencies demand that the authority to
make such decisions be distributed among numerous national and sub-
national actors.90 For example, the Commerce Clause mandates federal
regulation of wholesale electricity rates.91 States, however, retain authority
over retail electricity rates and most power plant siting and construction.92
Nuclear and hydro power plants are federally licensed and regulated by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and the FERC, respectively.
Further, environmental regulation of power plants is split along similar
lines between the EPA, the NRC, and the FERC.94 Finally, where states
have chosen to deregulate their electricity generation markets, they
implicitly vest the competitive market with the authority to set price and
capacity levels. 95
88. Huber, supra note 7, at 1002-04 (describing the national power system as the
"largest, most costly, and environmentally most voracious structure on our landscape").
89. See Stein, supra note 87, at 219-223 (siting of electricity generation); CLAIRE
E. KREYCIK ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., PROCUREMENT OPTIONS FOR
NEW RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (2011), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyI2osti/52983.pdf (evaluating renewable energy
procurement and pricing). See generally Huber, supra note 7, at 1003-07 (discussing
regulatory choices in the environmental regulation of electricity).
90. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey et. al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and
Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 125, 127 (2010) (commenting that in a federalist system, state action to abate
global warming and promote renewable energy is limited by the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, which among other things, acts as a barrier to State implementation of
feed-in tariffs).
91. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982) (declaring that "it is hard to
conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy").
92. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (reserving for the States the authority to regulate retail
electricity sales).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 5842 (2012) (establishing NRC jurisdiction over commercial
nuclear power plants); 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012) (establishing FERC jurisdiction over
federal hydropower plants).
94. See Huber, supra note 7, at 1010-12 (discussing the authority of the EPA,
NRC and FERC, as the three main environmental and safety agencies in the power
industry, to promote and force technologies within their jurisdictions).
95. See Ferrey, supra note 59, at 299 (explaining that after California deregulated,
market participants, not the California Energy Commission, were responsible for
securing power supply).
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The partition of decision-making functions along jurisdictional bounds,
while necessary given our federal system, effectively reduces multi-
objective optimization - the procuring right mix of electricity production
and technology that minimizes cost, maximizes reliability and minimizes
environmental damage - into a series of discrete choices.96 When
multiple regulators each act in isolation to maximize their individual
objective functions, they can work at cross-purposes and thereby arrive at
suboptimal or even zero-sum outcomes." The federal preemption of
states' initiatives to develop renewable energy and new capacity resources
are salient examples of how jurisdictional partitions may prioritize one
regulatory regime to the detriment of another.98
A. The Problem ofPreemption: Crowding Out State Authority over
Electricity Markets
The Supremacy Clause allows federal law to supersede state law either
expressly by an act of Congress, or impliedly through occupation of a field
or as a the result of a conflict with state law. 99 Energy law relies on
jurisdictional clarity to resolve preemption issues. 00 The settled approach
to federal preemption in energy statutes assumes that federal and state
governments serve as functional substitutes. Thus, when Congress expands
federal authority in a given field, it produces a commensurate contraction
in state and local authority through the adoption of preemption "ceilings,"
which create unitary national standards.o'0 When Congress has not clearly
96. Cf Huber, supra note 7, at 1003 (illustrating a similar dynamic in the context
of environmental regulation wherein multiple federal agencies sharing authority with
states over the single market for electric power never squarely confront total electricity
supply and its aggregate environmental cost).
97. See id. (explaining that as regulatory authority over the electric power industry
is dispersed among numerous regulators, final policy choices are often litigated and
extreme positions crowd out the broader middle ground).
98. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2014); .PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013), aff'd by PPL
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83
U.S.L.W. 3564 (Dec. 10, 2014) (No. 14-694); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974
F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff'd 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), petition for cert.
filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3450 (Nov. 25, 2014) (No. 14-614).
99. Compare Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 408-11 (finding that the LCAPP statute
was preempted under both the field and conflict preemption doctrines) with Nazarian,
974 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (leaving open the issue of conflict preemption after finding that
the Generation Order was field preempted).
100. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13, at 1286 (observing that while the entire field of
electric power regulation of public utilities is within Congress' power to preempt under
its Commerce Clause authority, Congress has consistently protected the role of states in
controlling certain aspects of public utility operations).
101. Id. at 1287 (noting also that state and local authority expands in areas where
Congress fails to adopt a clear national policy, such as a comprehensive policy
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delineated the limits of federal and state authority, courts define the
boundaries. 10 2
The unitary preemption approach presumes that the federal statute and
the challenged state law address the same regulatory objective. 0 3
However, where Congress has not articulated a clear regulatory purpose, or
where a pervasive federal regime touches upon a state law addressing an
unrelated regulatory aim, the unitary preemption standard may prevent
states from implementing their desired policies.1 0 4  In the PJM cases,
federal courts Circuit applied the unitary field preemption approach to
interpret the FERC-approved RPM as a price ceiling that prevents
Maryland and New Jersey from guaranteeing above-market prices.'0o
However, unlike the preemption of state clean energy regulations, which
signify state experimentation in a field unaddressed by Congress, the PJM
cases resulted in the preemption of state initiatives intended to resolve
reliability needs, a traditional state concern. 06
B. Expansion ofFederal Authority in Deregulated Electricity Markets
At first blush, the finding of federal preemption in the PJM cases may be
a surprise given that the Supreme Court has articulated a general
presumption that in the case of a conflict with a state law, the "historic
police powers of the states shall not be superseded unless it [is] the clear
addressing climate change).
102. See id. (arguing that the interpretive approach adopted by courts with respect
to energy statutes should favor floor preemption similar to the approach applied in
environmental law).
103. Id. at 1287-88 (explaining that traditional federal preemption in energy law
assumes that federal and state governments can serve as substitutes for each other).
104. See id. (asserting that the unitary preemption approach is likely to be
incongruous when applied to clean energy regulation); cf ScoTT HEMPLING ET AL.,
NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICES IN STATE-LEVEL FEED-
IN TARIFFS: FEDERAL LAW CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBLE SoLuTIONs (2010), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl0osti/47408.pdf (explaining that the FERC's ratemaking
authority under the FPA and the avoided cost cap under PURPA may likely preempt
states from establishing feed-in tariffs to promote the deployment of renewable energy
resources).
105. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372, 406 (D.N.J. 2013)
(holding that the LCAPP standard offer capacity contracts occupy the same field as the
RPM Auction); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 833 (D. Md.
2013) (holding that the Generation Order fixes the monetary value of wholesale energy
and capacity and is thus preempted by the FERC-approved auction mechanism).
106. Response/Reply Final Brief for Petitione'r/Cross-Respondent't Maryland
Public Service Commissio'n at 7, N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir.
2013) (Nos. 11-4245, et al.), 2013 WL 2474552, at *7 (arguing that the FERC
disregarded substantial, undisputed evidence that the Maryland Public Service
Commission acted solely to address a legitimate reliability need).
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and manifest purpose of Congress." 0 7  This implies that despite the
pervasiveness of the FERC's regulation of wholesale electricity rates, states
may still be permitted to operate at the interstices of the regulatory scheme
to address their local concerns.0 s However, Congress' promotion of
competitive markets over the last twenty years can be construed as
evidence of its clear purpose to displace state initiatives that impact
wholesale market price mechanisms.' 09
Further, deregulation and competition expand the scope of federal
regulation over electricity markets simply by increasing the number of
wholesale transactions." 0 Aside from the fact that the RTOs operating
competitive markets are subject to FERC jurisdiction,"' deregulation
introduces numerous brokers, aggregators, and intermediaries, thereby
increasing the total number of wholesale transactions.11 Thus, as
deregulation confers federal authority over a larger proportion of electricity
sales, the prerogative to define the governing principles over such sales
shifts from state to federal authority."13
Some of the FERC's pricing principles are generally held to pose
obstacles to state efforts to deploy renewable energy resources using state-
level feed-in tariffs."1 4 For example, the FERC has determined that while
states are not precluded from implementing feed-in tariffs to support
renewable energy projects, the prices that can be offered under such tariffs
are capped by PURPA's avoided cost standard with respect to "Qualifying
Facilities", and by FPA wholesale rates with respect to all other facilities."'
107. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (enumerating
several ways in which Congress may manifest its intent to preclude state regulation).
108. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2106 (2000) ("[A] presumption against preemption at least would permit the States to
regulate interstitially rather than be displaced altogether.").
109. See Id. (arguing that as Congress passes more legislation in a given field, the
inference that Congress intends to displace state law through field preemption becomes
stronger).
110. Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt
the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 109, 172 (2002)
(positing that competition creates more wholesale power transactions as generators sell
power to aggregators and retail customers for distribution).
11. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 2014).
112. Ferrey, supra note 110 (explaining that in 1998 wholesale power sales
exceeded retail power sales by 500% compared to 1996).
113. Id. (predicting that the FERC's pricing principles may dominate state-level
regulations through the filed rate doctrine).
114. See Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 243, 250 (2012) (citing two FERC decisions that endorse a
strong preemption position regarding prices in feed-in tariffs).
115. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC T 61,047, 2010 WL 2794334 at **18
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Similarly, the FERC's policy of promoting competitive markets has been
construed as preempting state pricing initiatives. 16
The PJM cases expand this trend as the PJM's FERC-approved capacity
auction mechanism has been interpreted as a constraint on the ability of
states to incentivize the development of new capacity resources, despite the
fact that states have historically regulated power plant siting and
construction.1 17 As a result, the market clearing prices set by the RPM act
as a ceiling to prices that electricity generators can receive, which in turn
guide where and when new resources will be developed. 18
The FERC's application of ceiling preemption in setting prices tends to
emphasize the singular policy of consumer protection at the expense of
other regulatory goals.' 1 9 To allow for some rebalancing in favor of other
objectives, Rossi & Hutton have proposed interpreting federalism in energy
statutes to permit regulatory floors, similar to those found in environmental
statutes, as a means of facilitating clean energy policies and other energy
innovation by state and local regulators.1 20 Thus, federal law, including the
FERC's wholesale pricing standards, would serve as a minimum that
precludes more lax state standards.12' This approach to statutory
interpretation is premised on the recognition that federal energy statutes
encompass a broader range of values1 2 2 in addition to consumer
(Oct. 21, 2010) (setting forth the conditions under which California's feed-in tariff will
escape preemption by PURPA and the FPA).
116. Rossi, supra note 114, at 254-55 (citing Duke Energy Trading & Mktg. v.
Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2001)).
117. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 97-98 (3d. Cir. 2014)
(stating that New Jersey and Maryland are free to make their own decisions regarding
how best to satisfy their capacity needs, but they will bear the consequences of those
decisions, including possibly having to pay twice for capacity).
118. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 813-14 (D. Md.,
2013) (explaining that out-of-market subsidies offer effective rates that are greater than
the market-clearing prices and citing expert opinion asserting that higher capacity
prices in a locational deliverability area encourages projects to be developed in that
area because the RPM "reflects the locational impact on need and on cost" of electric
energy).
119. Rossi, supra note 114, at 265 (arguing that the "New Deal price regulation
relic of ceiling preemption in setting prices" has led the FERC and the courts to
emphasize consumer protection over other goals embodied in federal energy statutes).
120. Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13, at 1287-88 (arguing that absent clear evidence
of congressional purpose to adopt unitary standards, an obvious conflict, or an obstacle
to a clearly defined regulatory program, courts and agencies should generally favor
floor preemption over ceiling preemption in the context of energy statutes).
121. See id. at 1336 (arguing that under a floor preemption approach, the FPA
accords with feed-in tariffs and other state and local efforts to promote and subsidize
renewable energy).
122. See Rossi, supra note 114, at 255-57 (arguing that PURPA encompasses
numerous goals including conservation and fuel diversity, and that the FPA "just and
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protection.123 Indeed, states account for environmental protection,
conservation, and efficiency when implementing state regulations, such as
integrated resource planning.1 24 The floor preemption approach, however,
may not be applicable to the PJM cases because the challenged state
actions implicate the FERC-approved market design rather than the actual
price levels.1 25
The filed-rate doctrine posits that federal wholesale rate determinations
may not be "second-guessed or overruled" by state regulatory
commissions.126 The doctrine is not limited to rates, but rather extends to
other "non-rate matters" such that states must defer to any valid federal
regulation.1 27 Thus, given that the FERC-approved market rules - not the
actual price levels - presented the constraint on state actions in the PJM
cases, Maryland and New Jersey had to yield to FERC regulations that
altered the market design.' 28 Conversely, interpreting the final product of
the market mechanism (the auction clearing prices) as a price floor would
likely contravene the intended purpose of competitive markets.1 29
The FERC acknowledged the potential for deficiencies in market design
and intimated that the solution is to incorporate features for the provision of
for public goods, such as reliability and environmental attributes, into the
overall architecture. 3 0 However, critics of this solution may point out that
the PJM market rules approved by the FERC in 2006 did in fact account for
reasonable mandate has evolved beyond New Deal consumer protection").
123. See id. at 257 (claiming that the recognition of diverse statutory values is more
consistent with preemption floors rather than ceilings, except where an obstacle exists
or Congress expressly intends to preempt state law).
124. Id. (noting a shift in "utility consensus," which recognized environmental and
conservation goals, notwithstanding the fact that updates in the law may have been
lagging).
125. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 97-98 (3d. Cir. 2014)
(recounting the Petitioners' arguments attacking the FERC's elimination of the MOPR
exemption for state-mandated resources).
126. Ferrey, supra note 110, at 170 (noting in Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal.
Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964), that the Supreme Court determined that
Congress intended to vest the federal government with exclusive jurisdiction over
wholesale utility rates).
127. Id. at 170-71 (including regulation of QFs, independent power producers
(IPPs), and public utilities).
128. See id. at 171 ("The [FPA] precludes all state regulation of interstate wholesale
power transactions.").
129. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,145, 2011 WL 5893596 at *90
(Nov. 17, 2011) (stating that the objective of the RPM is to provide the least-cost,
competitively-priced combination of resources necessary to meet the region's
reliability objectives on a three-year forward basis).
130. Id. (stating that RPM has no feature to explicitly recognize environmental or
technological goals, or to contemplate reliability needs beyond a 3-year forecast).
342 Vol. 4:2
THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
the long-term reliability goals of the states by guaranteeing auction
clearance for a state's self-supplied generation. The provision was
eliminated and subsequently reinstated in modified form on the ground that
guaranteed clearance would suppress market-clearing prices.132 The mere
fact that these issues were resolved through litigation rather than
negotiation demonstrates that following the FERC's suggestion and
modifying market rules through the stakeholder process alone may be
easier said than done. A separate regulatory framework may be required to
force the market to internalize the value of public goods, including long-
term reliability.
C. The Clean Power Plan
The PJM's capacity auction operates under the paradigm that a single
market clearing price, calculated for individual locational delivery areas,
promotes economic efficiency by encouraging sellers to minimize their
costs and thereby produce the least expensive mix of electricity resources
necessary to meet demand. 133
Under the "law of one price," it does not matter whether the electric
energy is produced by an old generator or a new generator; the energy
commodity itself, not its resource attributes, carries value in the
marketplace.1 34 This model provides incumbent generators with a bidding
advantage because older facilities, having operated long enough to recover
their capital costs, can bid into the market as "price-takers."' 35  In
comparison, new generators with un-depreciated capital costs are at a
competitive disadvantage because their higher, cost-based bid prices may
not clear the auction.136 To the extent that the single market-clearing price
reflects only the fixed cost of generation, and does not incorporate the
value of the resource attributes of electricity, the least expensive mix of
resources will likely be procured from older, more carbon-intensive
131. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 104 (3d. Cir. 2014)
(criticizing the agency for "fundamentally changing the MOPR's treatment of self-
supply, but barely acknowledging that it was making any change at all").
132. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372, 391 (D.N.J. 2013)
(describing changes to the MOPR in 2011 and 2013, which were implemented through
modifications to the PJM tariff).
133. Id. at 387-88 (recounting expert testimony, which hypothesizes that
competition among sellers who minimize costs results in low prices).
134. Id. at 389 (clarifying that energy prices may vary among PJM regions, known
as Locational Delivery Areas, due to transmission constraints).
135. Id. at 390 (explaining that when an existing generator bids zero, it accepts the
minimum benchmark price).
136. Id. at 389 (N.J. Board of Public Utilities rejecting the RPM theory on grounds
that it is biased against new generators and volatile short-term capacity prices render
long-term financing of new projects highly speculative).
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plants.1 37
It therefore follows that if the market-clearing price can account for the
value of resource attributes, then the market - acting as the regulator of
last resort - can also advance the states' concomitant goals of promoting
long-term system reliability, fuel diversity, and clean energy.'3 8 The EPA's
proposed rulemaking for the regulation of carbon pollution by fossil fuel-
fired power plants may provide states with a viable platform to incorporate
the value of environmental and reliability attributes into the non-
discriminatory wholesale electricity prices produced by deregulated
markets. 3 9
The CPP can be viewed as energy policy animated by environmental
regulation.1 40 As with other environmental regulations, the proposed rule
establishes a cooperative federalism framework for reducing emissions by
setting state-specific rate-based emissions goals, and affording states the
latitude to develop individual implementation plans, which reflect the Best
System of Emissions Reduction ("BSER").141 In its narrowest context, the
BSER is the combination of four building blocks used to determine state
emissions targets.1 4 2  However, the specific components of the BSER,
which consist of:
137. See Respondent/Reply Final Brief for Petitione'r/Cross-Responden't Maryland
Public Service Commission, supra note 106 (stating that the value of resource
attributes, such as enhancing system reliability, reducing emissions, economic
development, and competition are disregarded under the capacity market's net cost of
new entry analysis); Petitione'r/Cross-Responden'ts' Joint Statement, N.J. Bd. of Pub.
Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 11-4245, et al.), 2013 WL 2474553,
at *12 (citing the N.J. Legislature's findings in the Long-Term Capacity Agreement
Pilot Program (LCAPP) statute that as a result of a lack of new electric generation
facilities, New Jersey has become more reliant on coal-fired plants, and the state's fleet
of generation facilities is aging, with over 50 percent of the plants being more than 30
years old).
138. FERC precedent contemplates the inclusion of environmental costs in
wholesale electricity rates. See So. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC ¶ 61,215, 61,678 (1995)(Massey, concurring) ("The order expressly leaves open the possibility that states may
account for the environmental costs of all fuel sources included in an all-source
determination.").
139. See Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electricity Utility Generation Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (proposed on June 18,2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan] (proposing to
reduce nationwide carbon emissions released by the power plant sector by 30 percent(compared to 2005 levels) by 2030).
140. See id. (imposing emissions reductions requirements for regulated electricity
generating units pursuant to section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act).
141. Id. at 34,833-34 (characterizing the relationship between the EPA and the
States under § 111(d) as a partnership wherein the EPA sets the goals and States take
the lead in achieving them).
142. See id. at 34,855-58 (describing the EPA's analytical approach for
determining the components and scope of the BSER).
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(1) reducing the carbon intensity of existing coal plants through
technological changes designed to improve heat rates; (2) substituting
generation from coal-fired plants through increased utilization of existing
less carbon intensive units, including natural gas combined cycle plants;
(3) substituting generation from coal-fired plants with generation from
nuclear and renewable energy resources; and (4) reducing the total
amount of electricity required through demand-side management[,1l 43
encompass energy strategies that are already being implemented in some
states. 14 4 As such, the CPP has the potential to federalize state energy
policies to the extent that they are incorporated into state implementation
plans.1 4 5
Conceptually, the CPP comports with the theoretical approaches
articulated by both Rossi & Hutton and the FERC for facilitating the
provision of public goods in deregulated electricity markets.1 4 6
The CPP accords with cooperative federalism in the energy sector
because it sets federally enforceable emissions goals while giving states the
ability to achieve their targets in a manner that suits their particular
circumstances, such as load growth, existing market structures, and
availability of generation resources.147 Whereas Rossi & Hutton suggest
that agencies and courts should interpret preemption floors in federal
energy statutes, the CPP delineates the preemption floor for carbon
emissions. Further, the CPP expressly grants states the flexibility to utilize
different policy tools, such as the deployment of low-carbon energy
resources, which can also advance concomitant energy goals, including the
enhancement of system reliability.1 48 Thus, despite the fact that the CPP
relies on an environmental statute, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act
("CAA"), it promotes energy federalism in the manner envisaged by Rossi
143. Id. at 34,877 (explaining that the combination of all four building blocks will
result in greater emissions reductions at a lower cost than mandated reductions imposed
on affected coal-fired plants only).
144. See id. at 34,835 (stating that the proposed rule builds on programs, such as
renewable portfolio standards and energy efficiency measures, which have been
enacted at the state level).
145. See id. at 34,844 (stating that once a state plan is approved by the EPA, its
provisions become federally enforceable against the entities responsible for
noncompliance).
146. See id. at 34,903 (interpreting section 111(d) of the CAA in a manner that
gives states the flexibility to include other measures that are not performance standards
in their implementation plans).
147. See id. at 34,853 (declaring that the statewide application of BSER allows
states to account for local circumstances and state policy goals when determining how
to reduce emissions from affected local sources).
148. See id. (allowing states to impose implementation plan obligations on entities
other than the affected generating units).
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& Hutton. 149
In the PJM Cases, the FERC suggested that stakeholders can modify
market rules to recognize broader objectives in the valuation of capacity
resources. To this end, the CPP gives states the authority to establish
requirements, such as emissions allowances or mandated control
technologies, which can change the relative cost of coal-fired generation
vis-A-vis natural gas-fired, renewable, and nuclear energy generation.o50
These requirements, in addition to forcing emissions reductions, can serve
the parallel state goal of promoting the construction of new generating
facilities to improve reliability."' Natural gas plants, which are subject to
price mitigation rules in the PJM's capacity auction, may be more
competitive if states require incumbent coal-fired generators to bear the
cost of environmental compliance under the CPP.' 52
The FERC has indicated that the CPP need not conflict with the
regulation of wholesale electricity markets.153  Indeed, the regulatory
adaptation required under the CPP may simply be an acceleration of
changes that are gradually occurring as the state of technology moves the
power sector from a resource mix dominated by coal to one grounded in
natural gas. 154 For states that have been hindered by market constructs in
deploying new natural gas generation, the CPP may be a policy tool, as
envisioned by Solomon, that can be used to resolve local reliability needs
without treading on the FERC's exclusive ratemaking authority.5
149. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 13, at 1304 (asserting that as energy statutes
encompass coextensive national, state, and local regulation, preemption should be
applied narrowly to prefer floors over unitary standards).
150. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,882 (suggesting that states could
change the relative costs of generation for more carbon-intensive generating units by
imposing a cost on carbon emissions).
151. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,145, 2011 WL 5893596, at
*24 (Nov. 17, 2011) (asserting that natural gas-fired plants have the shortest
development time to respond to reliability needs).
152. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, 61,108, 2011 WL
1383624, at *31 (Apr. 12, 2011) (observing that unlike developers of generation
technologies that require long lead times, developers of natural gas combustion turbine
and combined cycle plants do not need to incur construction costs until after a project
clears its first auction).
153. FERC Perspectives: Questions Concerning EPA's Clean Power Plan and
Other Grid Reliability Challenges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power, 113th Cong. 45 (2014) [hereinafter FERC Hearing] (statement of Cheryl A.
Lafleur, Acting Chairman of FERC) (stating that the EPA makes environmental rules
which become the baseline in which the [electricity] system is planned).
154. Id. at 51 (statement of Phillip D. Moeller, FERC Comm'r) ("[I]t is a gradual
transition that is already occurring. We are already not building coal plants because the
science is not changing. .. [S]o science is driving this change, not EPA.").
155. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,901 n.274 (noting that a state-
driven portfolio plan is suitable for states that have restructured their electricity sectors
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III. USING THE CPP TO ENABLE RESOURCE PLANNING
States like Maryland and New Jersey, which have electricity capacity
needs that are not adequately addressed by competitive markets, should
design state implementation plans that meet emissions reduction goals by
adding new natural gas generation resources.
The CPP authorizes states to submit implementation plans that either
place the responsibility for achieving emissions reduction fully and solely
on the regulated coal-fired generators, or to adopt a portfolio approach,
which places enforceable obligations on entities other than the regulated
generators.156 A portfolio-based implementation plan may, for example,
include emissions limits imposed on coal-fired generators, and also a
renewable portfolio standard ("RPS") 157 and energy efficiency measures
that avoid carbon emissions. 15 The various measures included in a
portfolio-based implementation plan would create enforceable performance
obligations on a diverse range of affected entities, aside from the regulated
power plants.159
State plans may include enforceable measures that reduce emissions by
the regulated generators. 160 States participating in competitive wholesale
electricity markets should amend the capacity market rules to account for
the value of these compliance costs. For example, to the extent that
emissions reductions are achieved through the utilization of mandated
control technology, which results in additional capital investment or
operating costs, these costs should be incorporated into the minimum
benchmark prices used to assess the competitiveness of an offer in a
capacity auction.1 61  When the cost of environmental compliance is
by requiring utilities to divest their generating assets); FERC Hearing, supra note 153,
at 78 (statement of Tony Clark, FERC Comm'r) (observing that there is a potential in
some restructured markets to graft a state-led integrated resource plan onto the market
construct).
156. Clean Power Plan, supra note 139 at 34,901 (citing the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative as a possible precedent for a portfolio-based plan).
157. Id. at 34,849 (defining an RPS as a requirement that retail electricity suppliers
supply a minimum percentage or amount of their retail electricity load with electricity
generated from eligible sources of renewable energy).
158. Id. at 34,901 (noting that RPS and energy efficiency measures constitute
existing state programs).
159. Id. at 34,909 (raising concerns about practical enforcement against
noncompliance under a portfolio plan). But see Clean Power Plan at 34,888 (noting
comments by some stakeholders that measures affecting entities beyond the regulated
generating units, as a legal matter, cannot be part of the BSER).
160. Id. at 34,909 (describing the approvability criteria for § 111(d) state plans,
which differ from the criteria applicable to § 110 State Implementation Plans).
161. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 85 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013)
(defining the PJM's net cost of new entry as the cost of constructing a particular type of
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reflected in higher benchmark prices, new generators may avoid upward
price mitigation of their sell offers, and thereby remain competitive relative
to older, fully-depreciated coal-fired plants. 16 2 Indeed, placing a "fee" on
coal-fired generation to make natural gas-fired generation more
competitive - regardless of the market context (regulated or restructured)
may be necessary simply to preclude an unprecedented paradigm shift
from economic dispatch to environmental dispatch. 16 3
If a state adopts a portfolio-based implementation plan, it can mandate
the construction of new natural gas-fired combined cycle generators as part
of its system of emissions reduction. Building block two contemplates that
part of a state's emissions goal can be achieved by substituting low-carbon
natural gas-fired generation for carbon-intense coal-fired generation.1 6 4 A
state can likewise incorporate the construction of new natural gas-fired
combined cycle generators into its implementation plan. 165  The state,
having exclusive authority over the siting and construction of power plants,
could then strategically build the new units in capacity-deficient regions. 16 6
Any obligation to add new natural gas-fired generation under a state
implementation plan would be a legally enforceable obligation.1 6 7 Thus, a
state may have the authority to require electric utility companies to enter
into long-term contracts for the purchase of energy and capacity from such
generating units. The PJM cases, however, suggest that if New Jersey or
Maryland were to adopt such a measure without modifying the existing
RPM, new capacity resources may still be required to clear a competitive
generation resource, less the estimated revenue that the unit would receive from energy
and ancillary sales).
162. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 135 FERC ¶ 61,022, 61,088, 2011 WL
1383624, at *2 (Apr. 12, 2011) (explaining that uncompetitive sell offers, which fall
below the minimum offer price based on the net cost of new entry, may be "mitigated"
(increased) to a competitive level).
163. See FERC Hearing, supra note 153, at 40 (statement of Phillip D. Moeller,
FERC Comm'r.) (reconciling economic dispatch with increased natural gas utilization
may require "fee" on other carbon emitters to make them less competitive than natural
gas).
164. Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,877 (including the substitution of
coal-fired generation with natural gas-fired generation as building block 2 of the
BSER).
165. Id. at 34,837 (state plans may incorporate strategies that are not explicitly
mentioned in the building blocks, including construction of new natural gas plants).
166. But see FERC Hearing, supra note 153, at 25 (statement of Phillip D. Moeller,
FERC Comm'r.) (observing that limits on natural gas pipeline capacity may constrain
the contemplated increase in the dispatch of natural gas generation).
167. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,903 (proposing to interpret
section I11(d) of the Clean Air Act to encompass and allow various components of the
portfolio approach, which would render the measures federally enforceable once
approved into the SIP).
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capacity auction in order to count the resource towards the capacity
obligations of the state's load serving entities. 168
If the cost to construct new projects is prohibitively high relative to other
resources bidding into forward capacity auctions, the PJM cases imply that
a state mandating new construction under its implementation plan may be
placed in the untenable position of either paying twice for the new capacity
or not achieving its emissions reduction goals. 169 While this outcome is
plausible, it is not inevitable because the state actions taken in the PJM
cases were grounded in state authority. In contrast, a state's CPP mandate
to develop new natural gas-fired generation would be based on its state
plan obligations under federal law, Section 111(d) of the CAA. Any
conflict arising between the FPA and CAA would be distinguishable from
the controversies in the PJM cases, which involved the federal preemption
of state actions by the FERC's ratemaking authority. To the extent that a
state's participation in a FERC-approved competitive electricity market can
be harmonized with its duties under the CPP, states need not be compelled
to double pay for capacity in order to fulfill their enforceable obligations
under the CAA. For its part, the FERC has indicated that market rules and
rates can adapt to the new regulatory environment created by the CPP.c"0
Alternatively, states that operate within regional electricity markets can
adopt a multi-state implementation plan and coordinate their emissions
reduction efforts through an RTO, including PJM. The CPP affords states
this option as a means of reducing implementation costs. 17 1  Moreover,
both the EPA and the FERC suggest that state actions coordinated through
RTOs and independent system operators ("ISOs") can help maintain grid
stability and reliability.1 72
To this end, states facing long-term reliability violations may benefit
from a coordinated multi-state plan. First, as states adopt a common goal,
168. See N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d 14, 97 (3d Cir. 2014) ("The elimination of
the state-mandated exemption means only that if the states wish to use a new
generation resource to satisfy their capacity obligations required under the [RPM], the
resource must clear the Base Residual Auction at or near its net cost of new entry.").
169. See id. ("[I]f the states' preferred generation resources fail to clear the auction,
the states are free to use them anyway; the only caveat is that the states cannot use the
resources to offset their capacity obligation in the RPM.").
170. FERC Hearing, supra note 153 (statement of Cheryl A. Lafleur, Acting
Chairman of FERC) ("As I see it, the EPA makes environmental rules and those
become the baseline within the system is planned, and we have to make certain that
within those rules the rates are done in a just and reasonable way .... ).
171. Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,898 (describing several types of
flexibilities afforded to states in designing state plans).
172. Id. at 34,899; FERC Hearing, supra note 153,(suggesting that to promote
efficient compliance with the Clean Power Plan, the EPA should not only allow, but
should also encourage regional compliance).
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they will also have the flexibility to spread compliance costs among a more
diverse range of parties, rather than concentrating the burden solely on an
individual state's existing generators. For example, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which has nine participating states, operates a
carbon emissions trading program. 17 3 An overall emissions budget is set
for the affected power plants in the region, but the carbon dioxide
allowances can be traded by both regulated and non-regulated parties. 174 In
a similar vein, states that intend to reduce emissions by substituting carbon-
intensive coal-fired generation with natural gas-fired or renewable energy
generation would have a wider range of resources to deploy if they
coordinated their efforts. Renewable energy resources, in particular, are
not evenly distributed, so low-resource states could benefit by partnering
with high-resource states. 175 Further, the introduction of new intermittent
renewable energy resources to the system could require the addition of
more quick-start resources for reliability.1 76 Such planning could be more
effectively done at the regional level. 177
Coordination will also allow multiple states to plan and implement the
transition from a carbon-intensive mix of resources to a lower carbon-
emitting generation fleet with the least amount of disruption to grid
stability. The foreseeable capacity reduction that New Jersey attempted to
resolve in Hanna was precipitated by federal and state government
environmental regulations that required coal-fired plants to either be retired
or renovated. 17 8 The state actions taken under the CPP may produce similar
results or even exacerbate the number of retirements, depending on the
design of the state implementation plan. A state like New Jersey, which
already projects future capacity deficiencies, may want to participate in a
multi-state plan coordinated by an RTO simply to minimize the risk of
disruption to electricity deliveries within the state. Where a state intends to
173. Clean Power Plan, supra note 139, at 34,848 (noting that California
established a multi-sector, economy-wide GHG emissions trading program under the
2006 Global Warming Solutions Act).
174. Id. (explaining that carbon emissions markets create price signals, which factor
into the economic dispatch of the affected coal-fired units).
175. Ferrey et. al., supra note 90, at 134 (noting that renewable energy resources are
not as concentrated in the northeast region of the United States compared to other parts
of the country).
176. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 280-281 (explaining that the addition of intermittent
resources such as solar and wind would introduce more volatility to the grid, thereby
requiring more quick-start back-up resources).
177. See FERC Hearing, supra note (reiterating FERC's insistence on coordination
through RTOs).
178. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372, 392 (D.N.J., 2013)
(stating that federal environmental regulations enacted in 2008 required 7 to 11 percent
of all PJM generation resources to be retired or renovated).
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reduce carbon emissions by replacing coal-fired plants with new capacity
resources, an RTO can coordinate the transition to ensure that the lights
stay on.
CONCLUSION
Our system of national electricity regulation has demonstrated a capacity
to adapt to changed circumstances by incorporating multiple regulatory
values and goals. Whereas federal authority was first invoked to prevent
states from regulating in a way that burdened interstate commerce, the
current federal regulatory scheme now addresses the need for competition,
reliability, and environmental protection. And yet, the jurisdictional
authority of national and subnational regulators is so fragmented that some
entities' regulatory goals have yielded to others. In the PJM cases, state
plans for resolving reliability concerns were subordinated to the federal aim
of promoting competitive markets. However, as federal regulation adapts
to deal with the threat of climate change, states may find an opportunity to
advance their local reliability goals while simultaneously implementing
federally-mandated carbon emissions reductions.
The CPP's framework of cooperative federalism affords states the
flexibility to adopt measures that serve energy goals and reduce emissions.
States may replace carbon-intensive coal-fired generation with natural gas,
renewable energy, or nuclear generation as a means of cutting emissions.
To the extent that new natural gas power plants can be quickly deployed in
capacity-deficient regions, these projects can both enhance system
reliability and promote emissions reduction. Thus, states that have ceded
the authority to directly control the local electricity supply by deregulating
their electricity markets may use the portfolio and regional planning tools
available under the CPP to strategically design implementation plans to
advance other energy goals, such as system reliability and fuel diversity.
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